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Abstract 
This master’s thesis analyzes whether the household is a constraint on married female 
entrepreneurs, relative to male entrepreneurs. The research is based on an experiment conducted 
in Tanzania by NHH using PRIDE microfinance clients, and the data comes from the 
corresponding surveys attached to said experiment. My hypothesis is that the household is a 
larger constraint to the businesses of married females than it is for the businesses of married male 
entrepreneurs, and that this constraint is what prevented their businesses from experiencing the 
positive benefits associated with the business training from the experiment. Using economic 
theory from household decision-making models, I show how theoretically, women could be 
disempowered in the decision-making process and even potentially penalized if or when their 
business does well. The quantitative and qualitative data from the surveys reinforce this theory, 
as the household constraint is illustrated from the questions and data using the proxy indicators 
of a time constraint and a decision-making constraint. They show that the household is a greater 
constraint for women than it is for men, and that the training does not relax this constraint, 
meaning that the household is a significant and possibly primary constraint on the businesses of 
married female entrepreneurs. This is crucial in explaining the lack of positive effects from the 
training on the businesses of married women.  
 3 
Preface 
The irony of being a single, western, male student, writing and hypothesizing about married, 
African, female entrepreneurs, is not lost on me. However this thesis has been in the works for 
many years, and is the culmination of a distinct chapter in my life. It all began in the fall of 2006, 
during my junior year at St. Olaf College, in the small town of Northfield, MN. James Hosea 
visited and gave a presentation on NHH and the different programs and degrees they offered. 
This made a big impression on me; however it remained in my mind only a very distant 
possibility to pursue.  After graduating and working in the corporate world for a couple years, I 
decided to relook at going for my Master’s degree.  It was then that I first found out about the 
on-going research experiment that Bertil Tungodden and Kjetil Bjorvatn were conducting in 
Tanzania. After coming to Norway, Bertil and Kjetil graciously invited me onto the team, and 
last summer (2011) I went down to Tanzania to help conduct the last follow-up survey for the 
experiment. The data collection process in the field was an invaluable experience. Being able to 
see hundreds of the businesses of microfinance clients and extensively interview them first-hand 
is an experience that only few researchers ever have. Being one of those few, I feel it is my 
responsibility to share those insights and stories, in the hopes that from this, we can tailor our 
aid, education, policies, and financing to better fit the realities of their situations. 
This thesis has been both a challenging and rewarding process. There are a few people in 
particular who I am indebted to for their assistance, advice, and encouragement along the way: 
My supervisors, Bertil Tungodden and Kjetil Bjorvatn, for their constant guidance during the 
often tedious thesis writing process, and for bringing me on board the experiment; Their 
colleagues, Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge and Erik Sørensen, for lending me their expertise and help 
along the way; My Norwegian team members down in Tanzania, Jonas, Martin, Sara, Bjørg, 
Fredrik, and my brother Jonathon, for making that trip such a memorable time; In addition, to my 
Tanzanian team members, for your patience in translating for us and sharing your knowledge and 
expertise with us. 
Asante sana. Mpaka baadaye, kwaheri.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Human beings are endowed with endless potential. Society simply had not given these 
individuals the opportunity to scratch the surface of their potential. We concluded right from the 
beginning that all human beings are entrepreneurs—but only some lucky ones have found out.”1 
With this philosophy, Muhammad Yunis has catapulted microfinance to the forefront of 
economic development discussions, and it has become almost a panacea for all poverty 
alleviation problems. He postulated that the poor were natural entrepreneurs, evidenced by their 
ability to survive, and that all they needed to lift themselves from poverty was the right to have 
access to basic financial tools. However, while there have been some individual success stories, 
the overall impact of it has been minimal despite the estimated $30 billion in commercial capital 
that has been invested in it over the past decade.
2
 Most still struggle at the subsistence level, 
using microfinance as a consumption smoothing tool, rather than what it was designed for. This 
has led to the realization that relaxing the financial capital constraint might not be enough to 
enable people to lift themselves from poverty.  
In 2008, NHH collaborated with the PRIDE Microfinance Institution in Tanzania to study what 
the effects were of business training on micro-entrepreneurs in a developing country. The 
objective was to analyze whether relaxing the Human Capital constraint would amplify their 
returns to microfinance. In the results, it was found that the training did indeed have a positive 
effect, increasing the profits and/or sales of the businesses of the male entrepreneurs by 20-30%, 
furthermore that the human capital constraint appeared to be more binding than the financial 
capital constraint. However, there were little to no effects on the businesses of the female 
entrepreneurs from the business training.
3
 From this experiment, it seemed to suggest that for 
female entrepreneurs, there was an additional constraint that appeared to be blocking the positive 
effects from the business training. 
During my interviews with the microfinance clients, it became quickly apparent to me that a 
significant portion of the time and resources of the female entrepreneurs was spent on the 
household. The purpose of this paper is to analyze whether the household is that external 
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constraint which is blocking the positive effects from the business training. Both the married 
male and female clients are affected by this household constraint, however, because male clients 
were able to apparently overcome this constraint, it appears that this constraint might not be as 
equally binding on male clients as it is on female clients. So the first research question will be:  
1. Is the household more of a constraint on female entrepreneurs, relative to male 
entrepreneurs?  
If this constraint is equal for both males and females, then there must be some other external 
constraint which is binding female entrepreneurs. If, as expected, the household is more of a 
constraint for female entrepreneurs, then the case for the household being that significant 
constraint can still be considered. The second research question analyzed will be: 
2. Does the training relax this constraint for married female entrepreneurs? 
While the training did not have an effect on females, it theoretically could’ve relaxed the 
household constraint. If the training relaxes this constraint, then it would suggest that despite the 
household constraint being diminished, there is some other external constraint which was more 
binding. However if the training is unable to relax this constraint, it would strongly suggest that 
the household is a significant binding constraint on married female entrepreneurs, and would 
help explain the lack of positive effects on their businesses. 
The body of this paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 will present various economic 
theory models to explain the dynamics of the household decision-making process. This will help 
us determine in what ways the household could be a constraint; Section 3 will describe the 
experiment, providing the setting in which the experiment was carried out in, in addition to 
reviewing the past findings from the interventions; Section 4 describes the methodology of the 
experiment, and how the use of randomization enables us to use causality when analyzing the 
data; Section 5 reviews the quantitative data from the experiment and uses that data to help 
answer the two main research questions; Section 6 discusses what the findings mean for future 
policy considerations, and presents some alternatives to microfinance that might be better 
equipped to face the realities of the lives of married female entrepreneurs; Section 7 concludes 
and highlights the different areas where further research will be needed.  
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2. Perspectives in Literature 
 
When focusing on the effects of the household as a constraint on married female entrepreneurs, it 
is important to have an understanding of the dynamics of the household. In this section we will 
look at what economic theory has to say about the different dimensions that are at play within the 
household decision making process. From there, we will assess what these models would predict 
in our research analysis, and see if and how the household could be a constraint on married 
female entrepreneurs. 
 
2.1 Unitary Models 
 
The Unitary Models were the first approach to explaining the decision making process within the 
household. These models were developed in the 1950s-1980s. Their defining characteristic was 
how they treated the entire household as if it were a single decision maker. They included a 
pooled budget constraint with an assumed pooled total household income, and a cumulative 
utility function that included everyone’s utility in the household. The first model in this line of 
theory was the Consensus Model (Samuelson 1956) which had a maximizing single utility 
function for the household. The household heads would have a joint budget constraint from their 
pooled income. Therefore the expenditure patterns of the household would be unaffected by 
which individual brings in the income, because the consumption and expenditures would only be 
affected by the total household income. The other popular model was the Altruistic Model 
(Becker 1981) which attempted to explain how a consensus is reached in the unitary model and 
how the household resources were distributed. It assumed perfect information, and like the 
consensus model, also had a pooled household income. The head of the household, who is 
assumed to be altruistic, would then divide the income for each family member’s consumption in 
such a way that it would motivate them to continue to seek to maximize the family income.
4
 One 
important prediction associated with this model regards the effects from a change in the income 
of one of the spouses. It predicts that an increase in the income of the wife will be followed by a 
reduction in the transfers from the altruistic head of the household to her. In this model, both of 
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 9 
the spouses’ consumption must benefit from this increase in income, and the only way the 
husband can increase his consumption is by subsequently reducing the transfers to his wife.
5
  
With both of these unitary models, there was no room for household conflict because they didn’t 
allow room for individual preferences when deciding the household consumption. The 
assumption of perfect information in the models also made it hard to use this theory in practical 
applications where perfect information is rarely found. Bergstrom expounded on the Altruistic 
Model by introducing what he referred to as the Lazy Rotten Kid problem. It dealt with the 
situation in the household for when there is asymmetric information. He stated that the way in 
which the income was distributed could be a de-motivating factor for the household members, 
especially in the cases when they receive only a portion of the income they generate while 
having to incur the full disutility of the work.
6
  
 
2.2 Non-Unitary Models: 
 
The non-unitary models came in response to the unitary models. They argued that the view of the 
household as a single unit conflicted with the basic microeconomic foundations of individual 
choices and preferences.  
 
2.2.1 Cooperative Bargaining Models 
The main non-unitary models most commonly used were referred to as the Cooperative 
Bargaining Models. These models treat the decision making within a household as a bargaining 
process between the household heads, using the cooperative Nash game theory. The individuals 
each have a separate utility, are able to make binding commitments, still have full information 
and perfect communication, and the models allowed for them to have individual preferences 
which can affect the household choices.
 7
 Because the individuals have the ability to make 
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binding commitments and have full information, all outcomes of the models are predicted to be 
Pareto
8
 efficient.
 9
 
Lundberg et al (1997) tested if there was indeed a separation of utility between the husband and 
wife. By separating the utility, you could allow for the case that each parent may not value the 
welfare of their child equally. She analyzed the effects of a policy change in UK. Between 1977-
1979, the Child Tax Allowance (which was seen as a increase in the take-home pay of the father) 
changed to become the single Child Benefit (which was paid directly to the mother). According 
to a typical unitary model, this change wouldn’t affect the expenditures of the household. 
However, if mothers’ preferences towards the children were higher than the fathers’, and if the 
change in the individual income affected their bargaining power within the household, then the 
switch of benefits from the father to the mother could increase the household expenditure on 
children. Lundberg found this to indeed be the case, and that it provided evidence against the 
unitary model. It further suggested that children do better when mothers control more of the 
family resources.
10
 Much research has been done that also proves this to be the case, and is one 
of the reasons for why microfinance is focused on females rather than males. 
 
2.2.2 Non-cooperative Bargaining Models 
In the cooperative bargaining models, a Pareto efficient outcome is predicted due to the 
assumptions of binding agreements (in consumption, labor supply, and allocation) as well as 
perfect information. However, real life application of this theory was difficult because of these 
assumptions which rarely hold true. The non-cooperative bargaining models were not dependent 
on these assumptions, but rather focused on what would happen when there were self-enforcing 
equilibria to decide the allocations within the household. Because of that, they allowed for Pareto 
inefficient outcomes. 
Dubois & Ligon (2003) tested to see if intra-household allocation did in fact lead to efficient 
distributions. They were able to present evidence that suggested that not all household allocation 
decisions let to a Pareto efficient outcome. Taking data from an experiment in the Philippines, 
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they were able to reject the hypothesis of intra-household allocation efficiency upon observing 
that the allocation of the food expenditures, calories, and protein, was significantly related to the 
realizations of the individual’s off-farm earnings.11  
Udry (1995) was able to show a similar Pareto inefficient allocation outcome in Kenya. Udry 
observed agricultural production in Africa, carried out on plots controlled by different members 
of the household (One owned by the husband, and one by the wife). Traditional household 
allocation models (cooperative bargaining models) imply that allocation of the variable resources 
(labor and fertilizer) would be distributed in the most efficient way to maximize production on 
both plots, leading to Pareto efficiency. However, Udry found that plots controlled by women 
yielded a significantly lower output (about 30% lower) than those controlled by men. This was 
due to higher labor and fertilizer inputs per acre in the lots controlled by men. This would appear 
to contradict the Pareto efficiency of household allocation because the household could achieve 
higher output by either reallocating some factors of production from plots controlled by men to 
plots controlled by women, or by reallocating the land from the women to the men. Udry 
suggests a new conflict model to explain this situation where household allocation does not lead 
to Pareto efficiency.
12
 
In addition to allocation, lack of complete information and communication has also been shown 
to lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes. Ashraf (2009) was able to show how having the 
possibility of private information and limited communication between spouses would be needed 
in the models to be able to make more realistic assumptions about the household decision 
process. Using a set of experiments in the Philippines, Ashraf was able to focus on the conditions 
under which intra-household decisions are taken, especially conditions when information could 
be kept private, or when communication between spouses was limited. By doing so, Ashraf 
showed exactly how information and communication could affect the household decision making 
process, something that hadn’t been built-into bargaining models before.  
The experiment was set up in the form of a money transfer to the spouses, where the choices 
were: deposit it into a private account, or publicly take the money out to use towards 
consumption/cash. The settings were controlled to either make it a public choice among the 
spouses or a private choice by limiting the communication between them. Ashraf found that men 
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were more likely to deposit the money in their private account when the choice was private and 
communication limited, while committing the money to consumption when their decision was 
public to their spouse. This held true even when the amount that could be deposited in the 
account was decreased compared to the amount they could publicly take out in cash.
13
 The 
interesting thing here is that this appeared to be not a gender issue but rather a control issue. In 
the Philippines, it is a cultural norm for the women to control the financial and savings decisions 
in the household. So in the households where men were in control of the savings and financial 
decisions, the same decision effect was found with the women in the household.  
 
2.3 Application of Theory 
 
Having reviewed the various models of household decision making, the next step is to see what 
the models would predict for the present analysis. Under the Unitary models, they would seem to 
imply that the household would be a constraint for both the males and females equally, due to 
their pooled preferences and income. Both would be interested only in maximizing the total 
utility of the household for the most efficient outcome. Therefore they would allocate their 
resources of both time and capital to the house and their businesses in such a way as to produce 
the highest total income. However, we saw how this would only hold true as long as there wasn’t 
asymmetric information. With the Lazy Rotten Kid problem, the way in which the altruistic head 
of the household allocates the resources could cause de-motivation. When the husband sees that 
the wife is bringing in additional income, he reduces his transfers to her, shifting more of the 
household expenses to her responsibility. This effectively reduces her share of the income. She 
would then be experiencing the full disutility from having the additional work while 
experiencing none of the benefits. For the analysis, this de-motivation factor could be the cause 
for the married females businesses not growing. Essentially, she would be penalized if her 
business does well, and that could de-motivate her from wanting to further apply the training to 
grow and expand the business.  
From the non-unitary models, the predictions would vary based on whether they are cooperative 
or non-cooperative. In either case of these bargaining models, the bargaining power of the 
spouses would be effected by who controls the finances or how much each of them contribute to 
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the household income. In the experiment conducted by Ashraf in the Philippines, they found that 
based on the culture, women controlled the finances. The results of the experiment led to some 
Pareto inefficient outcomes when men tried to hide the money. In places like Kenya or Tanzania, 
they have the opposite gender norms, with men tending to control the financial decisions. That 
could explain why secret savings groups and clubs are so prevalent there, so that women can 
“hide” extra income they might have from their husbands. If women are disempowered, they 
may not be able to completely implement the business changes from the training, or may not 
have complete control in the decision of what to do with their profits. The next step is to consider 
the experiment and see if the data can confirm any of the predictions from the theory.  
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3. Field Intervention 
 
The Tanzanian field experiment began in the summer of 2008. It was carried out by NHH in 
coordination with PRIDE microfinance (Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development 
Enterprise). This section will give some basic background on Republic of Tanzania, as well as 
PRIDE itself, to provide the setting in which this experiment was carried out. It will then cover 
the two intervention areas of the actual experiment: Human Capital Intervention and Financial 
Capital Intervention.  Finally it will review the past surveys and the findings that came from the 
previous research done by Berge et al (2011). 
3.1 The Experiment Setting 
3.1.1 Tanzania 
 The United Republic of Tanzania is located on the east coast of Sub-Saharan Africa and is 
considered one of the more stable of the countries in that area, both politically and economically. 
According to the World Bank, the strong GDP growth of 5 to 7% the past decade has been due to 
mining, construction, and communication sectors among others. Despite these growth areas, 
around 80% of households in Tanzania still depend on agriculture as their primary economic 
activity, and poverty rates have declined only slightly during the past decade. In addition, high 
population growth rates have put increased pressure on their already strained power, 
transportation, health, schools, and food infrastructures. However, one of the bright spots in their 
development has been their success in reducing infant mortality rate by almost 50% between 
1991 and 2010, as well as their ability to achieve a primary school enrollment rate of 95.4%, an 
increase of over 40% from 2000.
14
 In regards to the financial sector, overall, access to financial 
services remains low, especially for the low income and rural population. In a 2009 Finscope 
survey, they found that 56% of adults were excluded from both formal and informal financial 
service providers. Only 12% had a bank account, and Microfinance organizations
15
 were only 
able to provide access to about 4%. Surprisingly 27% had access to an informal
16
 financial 
service provider. Additionally they found that 94% of the population worked outside of the 
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formal employment sector.
17
 With regards to the key to future growth and poverty reduction, 
IMF reported: “In the long run, only the private sector can generate economic growth, create 
jobs, and thus reduce poverty. But private-sector-led growth will require a better business 
environment and governance that is reinforced by modern regulation and an efficient court 
system.”18  
3.1.2 PRIDE 
PRIDE (Promotion of Rural Initiative and Development Enterprises) has around 70,000 clients, 
making it the largest microfinance institution in Tanzania. It was started in 1993 and received 
most of its funding from NORAD (Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation) and Sida 
(Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency). Most of its borrowers have 
businesses of less than $700 and operate in the informal sector which is estimated to support 
60% of the economically active population of Tanzania. In order to join PRIDE, one must 
already have a business operating, and join a self-selected solidarity group of five members. 
They then have a compulsory weekly loan meeting as well as a compulsory savings program that 
helps to act as part of the loan insurance.
19
 
 
3.2 The Interventions 
In 2008, NHH kicked off a study in coordination with PRIDE, to investigate the constraints of 
human and financial capital on poor entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam. They were able to perform 
separate treatments in the form of business training and a business grant to study the effects from 
both on the PRIDE microfinance clients. In that way, they could determine which of these 
constraints the primary constraint was for the poor entrepreneurs: lack of business knowledge or 
lack of financial capital. The experiments and surveys were conducted in two of the PRIDE 
branches in Dar es Salaam, Magomeni and Buguruni, with each having about 7500 clients.
20 
3.2.1 Human Capital Intervention 
The business training intervention was set up to as a randomized field experiment, and took place 
on a weekly basis between August 2008 and January 2009. This training consisted of 21 
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sessions, 45 minutes each, and was held after the mandatory weekly loan meetings which the 
clients attended at their local PRIDE branch office. It was developed by the Entrepreneurship 
Centre at the University of Dar Es Salaam and the classes were taught by their staff. The topics 
of the course were geared towards building entrepreneurship skills and stimulating business 
growth. These topics included such things a business record keeping, marketing, customer 
service, managing employees, financing, etc. In addition to the training, a lab experiment was 
also used to help determine the effects of the training on the entrepreneurs’ business knowledge 
and their mind-set.
21 
3.2.2 Financial Capital Intervention 
To determine if the lack of capital was a constraint or if it could help amplify the effects of the 
training, a business grant was given to a subset of trained and untrained participants in March of 
2009, six weeks after the training ended. The grant amount of 100,000 TSZ
22
 was approximately 
equal to the cost of sending one participant through the training. 
 
3.3 Past Surveys 
As part of the experiment, three surveys were conducted to gather data about the participants, 
their businesses, and their households. 
A baseline survey was conducted between June and July of 2008 prior to the interventions. This 
helped confirm the randomization
23
 of the selected treatment groups and allowed them to 
determine that any variations between the two groups afterwards would be caused by the 
interventions. They found that the average entrepreneur was about 38 years old, with 8 
completed years of schooling. In their small business, they typically hire only one worker, with 
only 20% of the businesses being officially registered with the government and thus the majority 
operating in the informal sector. Commerce is the most common sector (kiosks, market stalls) 
with about 70% of the clients, 38% are involved in the service sector (small restaurants and 
repair shops), and 15% in manufacturing (example, furniture making or brick making). Females 
dominate the service sector, while males dominate the manufacturing sector.  
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Table 1 below gives a summary of these statistics. 
Table 1: Group Characteristics 
    
 Men Women P-values 
Age 37.30 37.92 0.375 
 (0.59) (0.40)  
    
Education 7.73 8.04 0.082 
 (0.14) (0.11)  
    
Married 0.748 0.566 0.000 
 (0.03) (0.02)  
    
Children 2.61 2.96 0.025 
 (0.13) (0.09)  
    
Loan size 766,667 772,275 0.777 
(2008) (16,009) (11,614)  
    
Sales 3,062,518 2,187,640 0.004 
(2008) (228,591) (182,218)  
    
Profits 625,206 538,664 0.044 
(2008) (34,305) (20,417)  
    
Number of 1.53 1.55 0.696 
businesses (0.04) (0.03)  
    
Percentage in 0.703 0.697 0.874 
Commerce (0.031) (0.022)  
    
Percentage in 0.257 0.441 0.000 
Service (0.029) (0.024)  
    
Percentage in 0.234 0.111 0.000 
Manufacturing (0.029) (0.015)  
    
Employees 1.180 1.033 0.277 
 (0.102) (0.082)  
N 222 422  
Note: Table reports the average means from the 2008 baseline survey. Age: The age of the client in number of years. 
Education: The number of years the client attended school. Married: The percentage of clients who are married. 
Children: The number of children the client has. Loan Size: The size of the initial loan from PRIDE, in TZS. Sales: 
The monthly sales from the businesses of the client, in TZS. Profits: The monthly profit from the businesses of the 
client, in TZS. Number of businesses: The number of businesses the client owns. Percentage in Commerce, Service, 
and Manufacturing: The percentage of clients involved in each of these sectors. Employees: The number of 
employees the client employs.  Standard Errors in parentheses. 
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A post-intervention survey was conducted the following summer in June-Aug 2009. This follow-
up survey was able to reach 530 of the original 644 treatment clients. From the survey data, they 
were able to study the short-term effects from the training and business grant on the 
entrepreneurs businesses. 
In the summer of 2011, I took part in the third and most recent survey to help gather data on the 
long-term effects of the training and grant. It involved a team of 7 researchers working with local 
translators to interview the clients. The survey usually took place at the entrepreneur’s place of 
business or at their home and lasted an average of 90 minutes. The questions were focused on the 
entrepreneur’s old and current businesses, their estimated and calculated sales and profits, 
business investments and changes, employees, sources of income, etc. In addition to focusing on 
their businesses, it also looked at their household investments, living conditions, consumption, 
and happiness, among other areas. 
 
3.4 Past Findings 
From the previous surveys, Berge et al (2011) were able to come to three conclusions on the 
effects of the business training and the business grant on male and female entrepreneur 
businesses, based on the data that was collected post-intervention. 
1. Human Capital Intervention (business training) had an effect on male entrepreneurs, 
while there was no effect on females, and there was no effect from the financial capital 
intervention (business grant) on the business performance of either male or female 
entrepreneurs. 
2. The increased business performance in males was seen through an increase in sales and 
profits, but not in profit margins. 
3. Human Capital intervention improved the business knowledge in both males and females, 
as well as leading to a change in mindset (risk and self-confidence), closing the gender 
gap. However there still existed a gap in willingness to compete, with females being less 
willing to compete than males. 
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From these conclusions it appears that the primary constraint for men was the lack of business 
knowledge rather than the lack of financial capital. Once they were able to relax that constraint, 
male entrepreneurs were able to improve their business, seen with an increase in sales and/or 
profits. For women however, we observe that neither business training nor financial capital was 
the primary constraint, as there was little to no effect on their sales or profits from either. That 
means that the primary constraint was some additional external constraint that was blocking the 
effect of the training. In the next section we will review the empirical methodology of the 
experiments to help show how we can imply causality in the varied effects. In analyzing whether 
the household might be that external constraint on female entrepreneurs, we will analyze the data 
to show why there must be an external constraint and whether the household is that constraint. 
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4. Empirical Methodology 
 
We have now examined the setting that this experiment was carried out in, we have looked at the 
microfinance organization that the clients were part of, and we have observed the various 
treatments of the experiment as well as the surveys and preliminary findings. We will now 
examine the methodology of the experiment and how the data from the experiment can be used 
to help determine causality in studying the differences between the treatment and control groups. 
These differences (the effects) will help us answer the question: Is the household more of a 
constraint to married female entrepreneurs in Tanzania, relative to married male entrepreneurs. 
4.1 The use of Randomization 
When doing an impact assessment, the goal is to determine what the effects are of a treatment. In 
the case of this experiment, once the business training and business grant were provided, the 
question became: What is the effect of the training and/or business grant on PRIDE microfinance 
clients? However, it is hard to identify causality when comparing pre and post treatment effects 
for a single group. When addressing the issue of causality, the first question that needs to be 
answered is: How would microfinance clients participating in the treatment have fared without 
the treatment? Or another way of putting it: How would those not in the treatment, have fared 
with the treatment?
24
 It is difficult to follow just one group over time and compare pre and post 
treatment statistics, because there are other factors and inputs that may have changed and which 
may have an impact on this data. Other factors to consider would be change in age, experience, 
marital status, children, natural business trajectory, etc. To help avoid this dilemma, a common 
strategy is to use two groups, one that receives the treatment, and a control group that has no 
exposure to the treatment. In this way, we can compare the average impact of the business 
training and/or grant on the treatment group to a similar control group who hasn’t been exposed 
to the training or grant. 
However, one problem that still persists when trying to infer causality is the issue of selection 
bias. Dulfo et al define selection bias as the result of pre-existing differences between the two 
groups. These pre-existing differences could be both observable and non-observable. People who 
sign up for the treatment may already be more motivated, more competitive, have more mature 
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businesses, be in a different poverty class, etc, than those who are classified for the control 
group. Therefore, any differences in the outcomes between the two groups could be due to these 
pre-existing differences. 
One way to completely remove this selection bias is by using randomization in the selection 
process. The randomization ensures that both groups will be equal on both observables and non-
observables. By randomly assigning individuals to the treatment and control groups you ensure 
that the assessment provides an unbiased estimate of the impact from the treatment. In this way, 
you could then postulate that, had neither group received the treatment from the training and/or 
grant, their average outcomes would have been expected to have been similar.
25
  
To formally lay this out, consider the following mathematical equation
26
: 
                        
Where      is a person assigned to a treatment group and      is a person assigned to the 
control group; while     is the outcome for a person if assigned to a treatment group and     is 
the outcome for a person if assigned to the control group. Then this equation would be the 
expected difference in average outcomes of the treatment group and control group. To see if both 
groups are identical, we can now rewrite this equation as: 
                                                     
 
 
 
We can rearrange this as: 
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 This equation follows the general structure from Angrist & Pischke (2009) 
With randomization, this part will equal 0 since both groups would be identical. 
Without randomization however, this bracket would be the selection bias. 
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Finally, we can rewrite this in the following manner: 
                                      
 
 
Therefore, what we observe in the data (the difference in average outcome in the treatment group 
and control group) will equal the counterfactual definition of causality (the difference in outcome 
for a person if he gets treatment or does not get treatment). The counterfactual definition of 
causality is of course purely hypothetical, since either a person has training or he doesn’t, it 
would be impossible to measure. However, thanks to randomization, we can now measure this 
hypothetical difference by using the difference in data from the treatment and control groups, 
which will give us the average impact of the treatment. 
To implement randomization into this experiment, NHH was able to piggy-back onto the 
randomization process that PRIDE had already implemented. When a new microfinance client 
enters PRIDE, they are randomly assigned a day where they are required to come to their PRIDE 
branch for a weekly group loan meeting. The experiment used this randomization selection by 
randomly picking two meeting days as the days where the group members would receive the 
treatment. Two other days were then picked as the days where the group members would be part 
of the control group. By having separate days, this helped to further reduce the possibility of 
exposure to the control group. 
4.2 Summary of Group Characteristics 
Having seen how and why randomization was used in the structure of the experiment, we will 
now examine the characteristics of the group, using data from the baseline survey, pre-treatment. 
In the lending structure at PRIDE, they had three levels for the loan size on the group lending 
ladder. New members must ‘graduate’ from each level before transitioning to a higher loan size. 
Once a member has successfully completed the group lending ladder (in addition to other 
requirements) they have the opportunity to apply for group loans with added flexibility and size 
and finally for a higher individual loan. For the experiment, NHH chose to focus on the second 
and third steps of the group loans which represented loans between 500,000 and 1,000,000 TZS. 
The reason for excluding the lowest step was due to the high turn-over or burnout rate at that 
Observed in Data The Counterfactual definition of Causality 
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step. Of this group, they were able to initially interview 644 clients, 319 belonging in the trained 
group, and 325 in the untrained group. For the business grant treatment, 252 clients were 
randomly chosen to receive this grant, representing 126 each from the trained and untrained 
groups. 
Table 2 gives a summary of comparison characteristics between married women in the control 
group and married women in the trained group. The corresponding P-values will help us 
determine if there are any significant pre-treatment differences between the two groups. If there 
are, we can then use to characteristics as control variables in subsequent regressions. 
Table 2: Group Characteristics – Married Women 
 Non-trained Trained  
 Married 
Women 
Married 
Women 
P-values 
Age 38.04 36.82 0.221 
 (0.71) (0.68)  
    
Education 8.3 7.75 0.033 
 (0.18) (0.18)  
    
Children 3.09 3.08 0.959 
 (0.12) (0.15)  
    
Loan size 765,385 750,459 0.630 
 (21,083) (22,637)  
    
Employees 0.977 0.743 0.152 
 (0.13) (0.09)  
    
Number of 1.55 1.57 0.776 
Businesses  
 
(0.05) (0.06)  
N 130 109  
Note: Table reports the average means of married women from the 2008 baseline survey. Age: The age of the client 
in number of years. Education: The number of years the client attended school. Children: The number of children 
the client has. Loan Size: The size of the initial loan from PRIDE, in TZS. Employees: The number of employees the 
client employs.  Number of businesses: The number of businesses the client owns. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
From this data summary, we can see that the biggest pre-treatment differences between the 
control and treatment group for women is with their age and education, with women in the 
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control group being over a year older and having about a half a year of additional education than 
the women in the treatment group. 
4.3 Importance of Interventions in studying External Constraints 
The goal and design of this experiment was to study which was a bigger constraint: Human 
Capital (Business Training) or Financial Capital (Business Grant). This was done by relaxing one 
or both of the constraints and then using the subsequent data to analyze which constraint, when 
relaxed, had the bigger effect on the business of the microfinance client. In seeing that the 
removal of one or both constraints had little to no effect on married women, while men were able 
to positively gain from it, we can say then that some other external constraint is blocking those 
positive effects of the training and/or grant on married females.  
In this next section, we will assess to what extent the household represents an external constraint 
on married female entrepreneurs. That the household is a constraint on male and female 
entrepreneurs is no mystery at all. However, is it a bigger constraint on females? Why were 
married men able to overcome this constraint and take advantage of the training, but not married 
women? Did the training relax this constraint for married women? Using both the quantitative 
and qualitative data collected from all three surveys, in addition to the theories of household 
dynamics and decision-making processes, we will analyze these questions and see what answers 
we can garner from the data. 
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5. Quantitative Analysis 
 
To see if the household is indeed a significant constraint to married female entrepreneurs, the 
next step will be to look into the quantitative data that was collected in the three surveys during 
the experiment (2008, 2009, and 2011). It is safe to assume that the household demands of 
responsibilities and duties affect both men and women. However, men were able to overcome 
this constraint, suggesting that either this is not a primary constraint for women, or that the 
constraint is higher for females than males. So the first question to analyze will be: Is the 
household more of a constraint to females, relative to males? If this is the case, then the case for 
the household being a primary constraint can still be considered. If it is not the case (If the 
household constrains both males and females equally), then there must be some other external 
primary constraint for females. 
 
5.1 Is the household more of a constraint to female entrepreneurs, relative to 
male entrepreneurs? 
 
In using the data to analyze this question, we will look for survey questions that can be used as 
indicators for a household constraint. To do this, we should consider first, how the household can 
be a constraint. The most obvious constraints to the husband and wife would be due to 
responsibilities and duties in the household. These will be referred to as time constraints, as these 
responsibilities and duties would take them away from their business. Then, there are also 
decision-making constraints. Referring back to the theories of household decision making 
models, according to the non-cooperative bargaining model, lack of control of household 
finances might suggest a disempowerment when it comes to household decisions and even 
possibly business decisions. Initially we will abstract the treatment effect to study this constraint, 
so in this section we will only use data from the baseline survey or from the control group.  
5.1.1 Time constraint Indicators: 
There are two questions in the survey that can be used as indicators of how much the household 
is being a constraint on the time of the married entrepreneurs. 
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Hours worked per week 
The first question we can use asked, how much time the client spent working in their businesses. 
Taken from the 2008 baseline survey, we were able to quantify the total number of hours each 
client worked in their various businesses. Since this was the baseline survey, none of the 
participants had received any of the interventions, business training or business grant. Because 
we are looking for evidence of household constraint, we will only look at married men and 
women. For married men, the mean average of time spent working in their businesses was 69.15 
hours per week. This may seem high, but keep in mind that many microfinance clients operated 
more than one small business. For married women, the mean average of time spent working in 
their businesses was 58.94 hours per week. Interestingly, this is over 10 hours per week less than 
married men, of time spent on their businesses. This is consistent with there being a bigger time 
constraint on married women, relative to married men. 
Business distance from home 
For the second proxy for a time constraint, we will use a question that asked them how far their 
business was located from their home. If women have more duties and responsibilities at home 
than men, that would explain why they were unable to work as much in their business as men. 
This constraint would also affect their decision of where to locate their business. This question 
was from the 2011 survey, so we will now separate the control and treatment groups. The 
question asked them for the amount of time it took to get from their home to their business either 
by foot, or if it was too far to walk, by dala-dala (aka, city bus). For married men in the control 
group, this equated to an average mean of 23.38 minutes by foot and 47.8 min for the ones who 
had to take the dala-dala. For married women in the control group, they had an average mean of 
11.42 minutes by foot, and 16.09 by dala-dala. Additionally there is the possibility that the 
business is located in the home itself. In this case, the rate of married females in the control 
group with a business at home was 22% higher than the rate for married men in the control 
group. So not only did women have their businesses at home more often than men, but even 
when their business was not at home, it was still located much closer. By foot, their businesses 
were closer by almost 12 minutes, and with a dala-dala they were closer by over 30 minutes. If 
women feel that they have to be at home or close to home because of their responsibilities there, 
this would limit the types of businesses they could start and run in addition to limiting their 
choice of market and overall market size. 
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Considering these two time constraint indicators together, we can clearly see that the household 
is a bigger time constraint on women than it is for men. This is apparent in the amount of time 
they can put towards their business as well as their business location. Table 3 gives a summary of 
these findings. As well as highlighting the differences in the indicators between men and women, 
this table also shows that these all of these differences are in fact statistically significant. While 
this is not a causal proof of constraint, it is however consistent with the predictions of the 
household decision models. 
Table 3: Average Means of Time Constraint Indicators for the Control Group 
 Married Married  
 Men Women P-values 
Work hours 69.15 58.95 0.000 
(2008) (2.01) (1.88)  
    
Distance by  23.38 11.42 0.005 
foot (4.82) (1.80)  
    
Distance by 47.8 16.1 0.000 
Dala dala (7.11) (3.26)  
    
Business at 0.072 0.3 0.000 
home (0.03) (0.04)  
    
Note: This table reports the average means for time constraint indicators of married clients in the control group. 
Work hours: The number of hours worked per week, from the 2008 baseline survey. Distance by foot: The amount of 
time, by foot, it takes to get from their home to their business, in minutes. Distance by Dala dala: If the business is 
too far by foot, then the amount of time, by dala dala (city bus), it takes to get from their home to their business, in 
minutes. Business at home: Indicator variable taking the value of one if the client reports having a business located 
in their home. Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
5.1.2 Decision-making constraint indicators: 
The next step is to consider the indicators of a Decision-making constraint within the household. 
In the theory of household decision making models, control of the finances can be affected by 
either bringing more income than the other spouse or, by nature of the culture, being the altruistic 
head of the house. The control of the finances is then seen as giving that spouse more bargaining 
power when it comes to making household decisions or even business decisions. If, as is 
expected due to the culture of Tanzania, women have less control than men, then they may be 
constrained from making the proper decisions within their own business after the training, or 
they may be constrained in making the choice of what to do with their profits, how much to 
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reinvest, etc. To analyze the decision-making factors within the household, we will now look at 
an additional lottery experiment as well as questions from the most recent survey. Because both 
of these are post-intervention, we will again focus on just the control group for the moment. 
Household economic decision-maker 
The first step is to see who has more control of the financial decisions within the household. 
Because the 2011 survey was very extensive, looking into the client’s business as well as their 
household, there are a few questions that pertain exactly to this situation. The first question 
pertains to financial decision maker within the household: 
A: In a marriage, the husband typically 
makes all major investment decisions. 
B: In a marriage, the wife typically has the 
power to make major investment decisions  
Which statement do you agree most with? 
(A/B) 
 
  
From the way this question was phrased, we would expect there to be a huge gap between the 
men and women for those in agreement with statement A. Even if the husband controls the 
finances, not many wives would say that their husband makes all the major financial decisions. 
As expected, for married men in the control group, 92% of them agreed with statement A, that 
the husband typically makes all major investment decisions. For married women in the control 
group however, 67.5% of them actually agreed with statement A. This number was much higher 
than expected, and does suggest that there is some form of constraint. 
Support from spouse 
If the husband has control over the financial decisions of the household, as the above results 
seem to indicate, then this would align with the unitary Altruistic Model in the household 
decision making theory. In that model, the husband, as the altruistic head of the household, 
would be in charge of distributing the pooled family income to the family members. A second 
question asked them how much support they received from their spouse. If men are in control of 
the household finances, then they would be expected to be the ones giving support to their wives, 
not the other way around. This was overwhelmingly the case, with only 4.48% of married men in 
the control group getting support from their wife. The average mean of this support was just 
5,237 TZS per month. For married women in the control group, 59.82% of them received 
 29 
support from their husband. The average mean for this support was 105,221 TZS per month. 
When interviewing the clients, we found it common that married women would often get this 
support from their husband to cover household expenses, such as food, clothing, school fees for 
the children, and other household consumption expenditures. 
Business decision-maker 
The next question tries to ascertain if this household financial control of the husband extends to 
the wife’s business as well: 
A: Married female PRIDE clients would 
not grow their business much after 
business training because their husbands 
make all important business decisions 
B: Married female PRIDE clients would 
grow their business a lot after business 
training because they are in control over 
their businesses 
Which statement do you agree most with? 
(A/B) 
 
 
In this case, 33% of the married men in the control group agreed with statement A, while only 
8.3% of the married women in the control group agreed. While the number of married men in 
agreement with statement A is still somewhat high, overall this would seem to suggest that the 
financial control of the household does not extend to the big business decisions of the wife’s 
business and that the wife is still largely in control. However, we are still unsure if this would 
apply to the profit from the business, as that could still be seen to be part of the overall household 
income, in which case the husband would have control over that. If that were the case, then 
according to the Lazy Rotten Kid theorum discussed previously,
27
 the women might become de-
motivated as they experience the full disutility of work with only the partial benefit. 
Lottery Experiment 
In the most recent survey from the summer of 2011, an additional experiment was included in 
the form of a lottery. Each survey participant was automatically entered into this lottery for 
100,000 TSZ and they were then given the option of signing up one additional person. The only 
requirement was that both would be contacted if either had the winning ticket. For a married 
client, this meant that if they signed up their spouse for the lottery, they would double the chance 
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that their household would win the lottery. However, this would also mean that if they won the 
lottery, their spouse would know that they won and how much they won. The purpose of the 
experiment was to see if there was any treatment effect on their decision of whether or not to 
sign up another person and who that person would be. If the training was really effective in 
giving women more control in their household and over their business, thus empowering them, it 
may affect their decision to sign up their spouse if it meant he would find out if and how much 
she won.  
Referring back to the theory section, we discussed a similar experiment conducted in the 
Phillipines (Ashraf 2009). In that experiment, it was found that the spouse that lacked control of 
the household finances, was more likely to keep the money private, even if it meant getting less 
money.
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 In the case of this lottery experiment in Tanzania, 57% of the married men in the 
control group chose their spouse as the additional person to sign-up. While only 39% of the 
married women in the control group chose to sign up their spouse, choosing rather to sign up 
another family member, friend, or no one at all. This again would suggest some form of 
disempowerment, or constraint in the household decision-making process to married women. 
Table 4 gives a summary of the Decision-Making Constraint Indicators and their corresponding 
P-values. As with the time constraint indicators, the differences between the men and the women 
are all statistically significant, or in the case of the household economic decision maker, very 
nearly significant. 
Table 4: Average Means of Decision-making Constraint Indicators for the Control Group 
 Married Married  
 Men Women P-values 
Household 0.921 0.675 0.110 
Decision maker (0.03) (0.11)  
    
Support from  5,237 105,221 0.000 
Spouse (3,717) (9,423)  
    
Business  0.333 0.083 0.000 
Decision maker (0.06) (0.03)  
    
Lottery choice 0.567 0.387 0.022 
 (0.06) (0.04)  
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Note: This table reports the average means for decision-making constraint indicators of married clients in the 
control group. Household Decision maker: Indicator variable taking the value of one if the client is in agreement 
with statement A (In a marriage, the husband typically makes all major investment decisions). Support from Spouse: 
The amount of monthly support the client receives from their spouse, in TZS. Business Decision maker: Indicator 
variable taking the value of one if the client is in agreement with statement A (Married female PRIDE clients would 
not grow their business much after business training because their husbands make all important business decisions). 
Lottery Choice: Indicator variable taking the value of one if the client chooses to sign up their spouse for the lottery. 
Standard Errors in parentheses. 
 
5.2 Does the training relax this constraint for married female entrepreneurs? 
 
We have now shown how the household is a constraint for married female entrepreneurs, and 
how that constraint is greater for females than it is for males. The next step is to see if the 
training relaxes this constraint for female entrepreneurs. If the training is able to relax this 
constraint, then it would show that the household is still not the main constraint for married 
female entrepreneurs, and that there must be a different, external primary constraint affecting 
them. Important to keep in mind however is that the training and business grant interventions 
were not specifically designed for the purpose of relaxing a household constraint. However there 
are still ways this could theoretically occur as a result of the interventions, perhaps by increasing 
efficiency, productivity, increasing their ability to contributing more to the household income 
and thus empowering them in the household decision-making process, in addition to others 
factors. 
As in the previous section, we will again use the same indicators of a household constraint, 
looking at both time constraint indicators as well as decision-making constraint indicators. Here 
however, we will now focus on the differences between the treatment group and the control 
group, paying special attention to the differences between trained married females and control 
married females. As we have described previously, the randomization of the experiment allows 
us to now use causal analysis when looking at the differences between the two groups and 
attribute those differences to the treatment or lack thereof. To help control for any pre-existing 
differences, we will use control variables (chiefly age, education, and children) where 
appropriate. The basic structure for the regression analysis will be as follows: 
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Training is the dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the client i is part of the treatment 
group.    represents the various control variables. The treatment effect is reported with and 
without the control variables. While there is no need to include the controls to get an unbiased 
estimate, including them helps make the estimate more precise. 
5.2.1 Time constraint Indicators: 
As before, we will again be focusing on just married males and females, but this time will be 
including the treatment groups to the analysis. The focus here will not only be on whether the 
treatment led to a significant difference in these time constraint indicators for females, but 
whether it was able to close the gap between males and females that we previously saw. 
Hours worked per week 
Previously we looked at just the 2008 baseline survey and saw how married men worked over 10 
hours more per week in their businesses than married women. Now we will add in the data from 
both the 2009 survey and the most recent 2011 survey. Here I have separated out the trained and 
control groups. I chose to not to separate out the business grant recipients because that would 
reduce the sample size too much and further limit it. The focus on the business grant recipients 
here is not as important because it was only the training which had an effect on men.  
Table 5: Hours worked per week 
 Married Married  
 Men Women Difference 
Pre-Treatment 69.15 58.95 10.21 
(2008 Baseline) (2.01) (1.88)  
    
Control Group 64.64 56.65 7.98 
(2009 survey) (2.92) (2.36)  
    
Trained Group 65.99 58.56 7.43 
(2009 Survey) (2.83) (2.62)  
    
Control Group 59.42 49.81 9.60 
(2011 Survey) (3.84) (3.02)  
    
Trained Group 60.19 51.50 8.68 
(2011 Survey) (3.41) (3.41)  
    
Note: This table reports the average means of the hours worked by married clients in the treatment and control 
groups. These are the results from each of the surveys; 2008 baseline, 2009, and 2011. Standard Errors in 
parentheses. 
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We can see from this that in comparing trained married women to married women in the control 
group, the trained women worked between 1.5-2 hours more per week. However in looking at 
the gap between men and women, trained married men were also able to improve their hours 
worked relative to married men in the control groups. So the training closed this gender gap in 
2009 by only .5 hours, and by 1 hour in 2011. 
We will next run a regression to see if there is any statistically significant causal effect between 
the training and the work hours for married women. 
Table 6: Treatment effect on work hours - Married Women 
 Work hours Work hours Work hours Work hours 
 2009 2009 2011 2011 
Training 1.906 -0.319 1.689 1.700 
 (0.595) (0.929) (0.723) (0.721) 
     
Work hours  0.287***  0.207** 
(2008)  (0.000)  (0.015) 
     
Age  0.0267  0.0768 
  (0.917)  (0.820) 
     
Education  -1.024  2.078* 
  (0.326)  (0.073) 
     
Children  0.704  0.660 
  (0.565)  (0.698) 
     
_cons 56.65*** 45.83*** 49.82*** 15.98 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.345) 
N 239 239 239 239 
Note: This table reports the regressions of Works hours in 2009 and 2011 on treatment status for married women. 
The regressions are first given without controls and then given controlling for previous work hours, age, education, 
and children. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The regressions were run without controls first, before adding them in for both the 2009 and 
2011 survey data. In both cases, the treatment had no statistically significance effect on the 
amount of hours worked for married women. Additionally, we observed that the work hours 
from 2008 were strongly predictive in explaining the amount of work hours in 2009 and 2011.  
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Business distance from home 
In looking at the distance of the business from home, this question was only in the 2011 survey. 
Previously we looked at just the control group. Comparing that to the trained group now does not 
reveal any significant changes. For trained married women, their business location was actually 2 
minutes closer to home by foot than those married women in the control group. For those trained 
married women who had to take the dala-dala, they had an average mean of less than 1 minute 
difference from those in the control group. Finally, 32% of the trained married women had a 
business in their home, while 29% of married women in the control group had a business in their 
home. 
Here, we will again run a regression to see if there is any statistically significant causal effect 
between the training and the business location. 
Table 7: Treatment effect on business distance from home - Married Women 
 Distance 
by 
Distance 
by 
Distance 
by 
Distance 
by 
Business 
located at  
Business 
located at  
 Foot Foot Dala-dala Dala-dala Home Home 
Training -2.140 -2.403 -0.397 0.0400 0.0303 0.0479 
 (0.369) (0.306) (0.952) (0.995) (0.614) (0.412) 
       
Work hours  0.0442  -0.0761  0.000594 
(2008)  (0.282)  (0.495)  (0.452) 
       
Age  -0.302**  0.0757  0.00822* 
  (0.038)  (0.795)  (0.070) 
       
Education  -0.0491  -0.364  0.0152 
  (0.932)  (0.780)  (0.313) 
       
Children  -1.420**  -0.912  0.0288 
  (0.047)  (0.505)  (0.257) 
       
_cons 11.42*** 25.11*** 16.10*** 23.34 0.300*** -0.258 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.170) 
N 173 173 116 116 239 239 
Note: This table reports the regressions of Distance by Foot, Distance by Dala-dala, and Business located at Home 
on treatment status for married women. The regressions are first given without controls and then given controlling 
for 2008 work hours, age, education, and children. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
The first regression is the time difference by foot of the business from home. Here the treatment 
actually results in a time decrease, meaning the business is closer to the home. However this is 
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not statistically significant. Interestingly, we note that among the control variables, the older a 
person is and the more children they have, the closer their business is to their home. The next 
regression measures the correlation in time distance by dala-dala, with the final regression 
measuring the correlation in percentage of those with a business at home. Both of these reveal 
only minor differences, and these are not statistically significant. 
Overall, when looking at the indicators of both hours worked and distance from home, business 
training does not appear to have significantly relaxed this time constraint of the household for 
married women. 
5.2.2 Decision-making constraint indicators: 
The second set of indicators deal with the issue of a decision-making constraint. We saw in the 
previous section how it appeared that men had control of the household finances and how 
women showed this constraint in part by wanting to keep potential lottery winnings a secret. We 
will now compare the answers of the control group with those of the trained group for married 
men and women, to see if the training helped empower women in the household, gave them more 
bargaining power in the household decision-making process, or improved their control of the 
household income. 
Household economic decision-maker 
Regarding the question of who makes the financial decisions within the household, we find only 
a minor difference. Here, 50% of the trained married women agreed with this statement, 
compared to 53% in the control group. Trained men actually saw a greater difference, with 87% 
agreeing with this statement whereas in the control group this was at a 92% agreement. 
Business decision-maker 
The next question looks to see if that household control of husband extends to the wife’s 
business as well. We now find that 13% of trained married women agree with this statement, this 
is up from the 8.3% in agreement in the control group. One possible explanation for this might 
be because the training may have just made her more aware of this constraint. However, with 
still only 13% agreement, it is not enough to make it a significant argument. 
Table 8 presents the regressions for both questions pertaining to the decision maker, household 
and business. 
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Table 8: Treatment effect on Decision-making Indicators - Married Women 
 Household Household Business Business 
 Decision 
Maker 
Decision 
Maker 
Decision 
Maker 
Decision 
Maker 
Training -0.0908 -0.0626 0.134 0.162 
 (0.523) (0.703) (0.170) (0.176) 
     
Age  0.0157  0.00619 
  (0.353)  (0.194) 
     
Education  0.0187  0.0307 
  (0.659)  (0.442) 
     
Children  -0.0368  0.0897 
  (0.485)  (0.218) 
     
_cons 0.675*** 0.0362 0.0833*** -0.690 
 (0.000) (0.963) (0.001) (0.294) 
N 221 221 221 221 
Note: This table reports the regressions of Household Decision Maker and Business Decision Maker on treatment 
status for married women. The regressions are first given without controls and then given controlling for age, 
education, and children. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
We can see that there is no treatment affect when it comes to who has control of the household 
finances. There is a slight treatment affect when it comes to whether the husband also makes the 
decisions in the wife’s business. However this effect is not a positive effect, it is not a reduction 
in this constraint, but rather results in a greater agreement to this statement from married trained 
women. We have postulated that the reason may have been that the training made them more 
aware of this type of constraint. 
Support from spouse 
In the question on how much support they receive from their spouse, we actually see the biggest 
difference. The ratio of married women receiving support remains virtually unchanged at about 
60%, however the amount of support is significantly lower for trained married women. In the 
control group, the average mean of support from their husband came to 105,221 TZS per month. 
For married trained women, the average mean of support from their husband was 83,018. 
Table 9 gives the summary of the regression for this question, highlighting the correlation of the 
treatment and the decreased support from the spouse. 
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Table 9: Treatment effect on Support from Spouse - Married Women 
 Support from Support from Support from 
 Spouse Spouse Spouse 
Training -22202.9* -21496.0* -18743.1 
 (0.088) (0.093) (0.153) 
    
Grant  -25053.0* -24096.0* 
  (0.059) (0.068) 
    
Age   -454.1 
   (0.653) 
    
Education   5277.5* 
   (0.098) 
    
Children   2567.4 
   (0.595) 
    
_cons 105221.1*** 114872.7*** 79747.9* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.097) 
N 226 226 226 
Note: This table reports the regressions of Support from Spouse on treatment status for married women. The 
regressions are first given without controls and then given controlling for age, education, and children. Cluster 
robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Here we can see how both the presence of training and the business grant corresponded with 
significantly less of an amount of support from the spouse when compared to the married women 
in the control group. 
An additional question in the survey might shed some light on this difference. 58% of trained 
married women agreed with the statement: As a females’ business grows, the female gets more 
responsibility in the household. When asked what these responsibilities included, the responses 
ranged from paying for school fees, buying food, to paying medical expenses. These were all 
things that the support from their spouse had been going towards, the household expenses. 
Combining these two questions, one could argue that as a trained woman is able to improve her 
business (through increased productivity or efficiency), the support from her spouse drops. 
Digging into some of the qualitative data, many of the detailed answers to this question from the 
clients seemed to confirm this explanation. Devota Wansato was a married mother, operating 
three small business. In response to this question, Devota stated: “When men realize his wife is 
making money, they don’t contribute or they reduce household contribution, which is then 
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covered by women.” Juliana Chowo stated a similar problem saying, “Men tend to reduce the 
household contribution if women do well in business.” Yusta Silayo described that the additional 
responsibility even went beyond the immediate family, “When the business grows, more of my 
friends and relatives come to me for money, because they know I have money now.” Returning to 
the economic theory, according to Ermisch (2003), in a bargaining and altruistic model of 
household decision-making, an increase on income in one spouse will result in the decrease of 
transfers from the other spouse. According to the model, both spouses must benefit from the 
increased income, and in this case, the only way the husband can benefit from the wife’s income 
is by decreasing his support to her.
29
 This would also explain why this business improvement 
wasn’t reflected in an increase of sales or profits at the time of the surveys.  If the wife is now 
forced to pay for more of the household expenses, she will be forced to use the profits and loans 
from her business to do so, reducing the possibility of investing those back into the business to 
make it grow. 
With regards to how this affects the household constraint on the wife, there is both a positive and 
a negative interpretation to this situation. The positive is that, if we take a decreased support 
from the spouse as a signal of an improvement in her business, then in a traditional bargaining 
model of household-hold decision-making, she would improve her bargaining position in the 
household. She would then have more control over the financial decisions in the household. This 
is also a positive for the children, if she is paying for more of their expenses, as it has been 
proven that children are better off if mothers control more of the household resources. However 
this situation is also a negative for her business and actually acts to amplify the household 
constraint on her business. By having to cover more of the household expenses, this is potentially 
taking valuable resources and capital away from her business, effectively starving it from future 
growth. 
Lottery Experiment 
Finally we come to the lottery experiment. Here we find that the number of women who chose 
their spouse has actually decreased, with only 35% of trained women choosing their spouse, 
compared to 39% in the control group. We see an even bigger drop with men, as 44% of the 
trained men chose their spouse compared to the 57% in the control group. Table 10 shows the 
regression for the treatment effect on women from this lottery experiment. 
                                                          
29
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Table 10: Treatment effect on the Lottery Choice - Married Women 
 Lottery Lottery 
 Choice Choice 
Training -0.0396 -0.0576 
 (0.558) (0.408) 
   
Work hours  0.000527 
(2008)  (0.641) 
   
Age  -0.0147*** 
  (0.001) 
   
Education  0.00643 
  (0.709) 
   
Children  0.0131 
  (0.576) 
   
_cons 0.387*** 0.825*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
N 217 217 
Note: This table reports the regressions of the clients’ Lottery Choice on treatment status for married women. The 
regressions are first given without controls and then given controlling for 2008 work hours, age, education, and 
children. Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
Adding in the control variables led to a negative treatment effect of about 5.8%. That is, trained 
married women chose their spouse 5.8% less of the time than married women in the control 
group. However, this difference is not statistically significant. Overall, the training effect did not 
appear to significantly relax this constraint. 
5.3 Data Summary 
From this data we were able to learn that there are both time and decision-making constraints on 
female entrepreneurs. We saw this in the amount of time they were able to spend working, where 
their business was located, who controlled the finances, how the transfers from their husbands’ 
decreased when they received training, as well as their perceived need to hide money from their 
husbands’ seen in their lottery choice. We can therefore conclude that there is suggestive 
evidence that married women are more constrained by the household than married men are, and 
that the training was unable to relax this constraint. This is crucial in explaining the lack of 
positive effects from the training on the businesses of married women.  
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6. Policy Implications 
We have now analyzed the data, researching to what extent the household is a constraint on 
female entrepreneurs in Tanzania. From this data we have been able to suggest that the 
household does in fact appear to be a significant constraint on married female entrepreneurs, 
limiting the effects of business training through time and decision-making constraints as well as 
absorbing valuable business resources. Additionally, we found that the training does not appear 
to significantly relax this constraint. The two findings may have important policy implications on 
the field of microfinance. The way the structure is set up now, it appears that the married females 
have to choose between their household and their business. The implication for future policy will 
be, how can the financial tools be adapted to help the household and the business of married 
female entrepreneurs coexist? 
What needs to be reevaluated by microfinance organizations and impact assessment studies is the 
question of: what constitutes success? If the only goal of the entrepreneur is to use the business 
to support and increase household consumption and improve the quality of living, rather than 
focusing on growing the business, is this broader reinterpretation of microfinance still success? 
Depending on what the goals are for microfinance, and what they determine success is, the 
overall concept will need to be retailored to fit the lives of the married female entrepreneurs. 
Below are a few financial tools that could be alternatives to microfinance or work in conjuncture 
with it, as well as a few reinterpretations of the microfinance model that will help it to better 
address this household constraint. 
6.1 Credit unions, Roscas, & MicroSaving 
Beck & Ogden stated in the 2007 Harvard Business Review, “Many heads of microfinance 
programs now privately acknowledge what John Hatch, the founder of FINCA International (one 
of the largest microfinance institutions), has said publicly: 90% of microloans are used to finance 
current consumption rather than to fuel enterprise.”30 If the goal is to use the business and loans 
as a means to support consumption smoothing, then there are better tools than a microfinance 
loan to do this. Microfinance loans, due to their small size and the lack of credit history and 
collateral of the borrower, tend to have high interest rates. As microfinance institutions began to 
shift towards the for-profit model, the goals and purpose of those organizations naturally shifted 
as well. However, even the most well meaning organizations, when faced with making their 
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model sustainable, are forced to charge high interest rates. For PRIDE, these rates annualized to 
50% interest. When you have business loans with such high interest rates being used for 
consumption and not investment, it is unsustainable and could eventually lead to default or high 
indebtedness. 
A different approach would be to prioritize using savings and credit associations, or credit unions 
among married females. These associations tend to have lower interest rates on the loans while at 
the same time promoting savings. These credit unions are community-based and controlled, 
where the poor save their money and then lend to each other. One credit union model has each 
member contributing an agreed upon amount at a weekly meeting. At this meeting, the members 
then decide how much of the fund to lend, to whom, and the terms of the loan. After an agreed 
upon length of time, each member then receives back their savings along with a dividend 
representing the earned interest from the loans. These groups tend to be much smaller than a 
typical microfinance institution, and because of that, they are able to lend out small loans as well 
as large loans, enabling them to reach many levels of poverty. Also, because the interest rates are 
much lower, the loans can be better used for consumption smoothing as well as business 
ventures.
31
  
Another widespread model are Roscas (Rotating savings and credit associations). These tend to 
be smaller, and are often exclusive to women. In these associations, the women contribute their 
savings to the group fund at each meeting and each meeting one of the members gets to take the 
fund as a loan in a predetermined order. The fund or ‘pot’ continues to be rotated to each 
member every meeting until each of them has received it. Many of these Roscas also are secret 
clubs, allowing the women to hide their savings from their husbands. Many of the PRIDE clients 
that were interviewed were already Roscas members on the side. However there was a 
perception that these types of savings clubs were riskier. Since these clubs were more informal 
and smaller than larger microfinance institutions, there was a higher risk that a member might 
walk away with their money. In addition there is less flexibility in the timing of the loan and the 
amount in that it is on a set week schedule with a fixed amount.
32
 
A relatively new model being used is the MicroSavings model. Presented as a viable alternative 
to MicroCredit, it operates in much the same way as Roscas but with added loan flexibility, and 
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with less overhead than most microfinance institutions. One estimate from Jeff Ashe, the leader 
of Oxfam America’s MicroSavings project, puts the startup costs at $20 per client, compared to 
$200 for a typical microcredit borrower.
33
 Additionally, unlike the Roscas, where the women 
only get the loan on a rotating schedule, this model would allow them to take out a loan when 
needed, improving flexibility for emergency or consumption smoothing situations. Due to its 
smaller size, it would naturally be less geared towards micro entrepreneurship. However, it is 
feasible to consider both microsavings and microcredit models working together, and indeed, 
many microfinance organizations are working towards building up and priorizing their savings 
programs. 
6.2 India’s Kerala model of Microfinance 
If the goal is instead to help married women focus on and invest more in their business, then the 
credit union and Roscas models might be too restrictive in their lending structure. In this case, 
microfinance still appears to be the best option, however in perhaps a different form that better 
addresses the reality of the household constraint. In his book, Why Doesn’t Microfinance Work?, 
Milford Bateman highlights three major problems of microfinance: The first being that it 
produces major redundancies in the types of businesses; Secondly that it diverts attention and 
finances away from Small-Medium size Enterprises (SMEs), where real growth is generated, to 
these single-owner micro-businesses which are unable to take advantage of economies-of-scale; 
Third, that it leads to an isolation of the clients.
34
 During my time with the field research 
experiment in Tanzania, these problems were very apparent. It wasn’t uncommon to drive down 
a block and see multiples of soda kiosks, tailors, or restaurants, all offering the same services and 
products. One of the reasons is, because they start out with such a small individual loan, it limits 
the types of business they can start. In addition, their choice of business is often in an area that 
they are familiar with or is something they do already in their household. That is why women 
tend to choose cooking, sewing, etc, and why they often operate it out of their home, regardless 
if their neighbor is doing the same thing. These types of businesses have a natural ceiling to how 
much they can grow. 
Bateman goes on to present an alternative, using the example of a form of microfinance used in 
the town of Kerala in India. Like a traditional microfinance model, they also use solidarity 
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groups to lend to; however, instead of handing out 5 individual loans to the group for five 
individual businesses, they lend one group loan for one group business. These loans are given 
out at a local coop bank and the loan is matched by group’s own savings, helping promote 
savings and avoid an over-reliance on loans. In addition, the group business must be signed off 
by the village council to make sure that it fits within the overarching town development plan, 
helping to avoid business redundancies and overinvestment in any one industry. Thus, this model 
seeks to solve three issues in microfinance by building up the interconnectedness of the clients, 
increasing the size of the business ventures, and working to avoid overinvestment in the types of 
businesses.
35
 
In addition to helping correct these issues, this Kerala model of microfinance could also help to 
minimize the constraint of the household that the married females are facing. It would enable 
women to start a larger businesses that have higher growth potential, while being able to share 
the workload with 4 others. This workload may have been a deal-breaker if she were to do it on 
her own as it could conflict with her other responsibilities to her children and household. Also, 
by tying the interests of the five women together to one business, it would help create a clearer 
separation between the business and household, helping keep the profits and loans within the 
business.  
6.3 Loan Structure 
Lastly, if the goal is to shift the focus towards helping married females start businesses with 
higher growth potential, then perhaps the typical microfinance loan structure needs to be 
reevaluated. The way the microfinance loans are set up now more resemble a typical consumer 
loan rather than a small business loan. Once a borrower is approved for a loan, they have to 
begin the weekly repayment cycles immediately. This forces the clients into the types of business 
that produce a fast profit so they can start the repayment immediately. However, those types of 
businesses also tend to be low growth types of businesses, geared towards short-term volume. By 
allowing a grace period in the beginning, and extending the loan repayment schedule, you could 
allow the borrowers to enter into the types of business that may have slower profit, but in the 
long-term, larger growth & profit. It would help spur more long-term planning in the overall 
business strategy.  
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7. Conclusion 
We came into this thesis with the question of: what is that external constraint on female 
entrepreneurs that is preventing them from taking advantage of the business training and growing 
their businesses? The hypothesis was that the household was that external constraint, which was 
sapping their time and resources away from their business and constraining it from growing. 
Using economic theory of household decision making models and the quantitative data from the 
Tanzania experiment, we were able to show that the data strongly suggested this to be the case. 
Female entrepreneurs were constrained by time, seen in the amount of time they were able to 
spend on their business; they were constrained in the decision of where to locate their business; 
they were constrained in their lack of control in the household decision-making process; and they 
were constrained by having to cover more of the household expenses as their business did better. 
It was also found that the training was unable to relax this constraint, meaning that for female 
entrepreneurs, the household is a more binding constraint on their business than the financial and 
human capital constraints.  
That’s not to say it’s only a negative that the females are having to cover more of the household 
expenses. Studies have shown that the kids are better off when this happens, and it could allow 
the husband to either invest more in his business or provide for his family in other ways. 
However, the way the structure is now, it appears that there are only two choices for female 
entrepreneurs: Either the household is better off and the business suffers, or the business is better 
off and the household suffers. We saw in section 6, how it doesn’t have to be limited to those 
two choices. There are other financial tools that may work better as an alternative or in 
conjuncture with microfinance to help these two aspects of the female entrepreneur’s life coexist. 
So what can be done to help relax this constraint? In order to keep the business profits invested 
within the business, the household expenses will need to be covered in other ways. Some 
microfinance institutions are exploring the concept of microinsurance. Theoretically, this would 
have significant impact on reducing the use of business profits and loans on the consumption 
smoothing emergencies. Additionally, further research should be taken to study the effects on a 
household of a subsidy on school fees (which currently takes a significant amount of their 
resources). Once a way has been found to relax this constraint, female entrepreneurs will be able 
to better take advantage of the business training and loans to grow their business and unleash 
their potential.  
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